2 The role of central government was essentially limited to maintaining the security of external relations, both diplomatic and fiscal, the payment and staffing of services related to this, and the provision of ultimate force for the maintenance of internal order in emergencies. Localities were granted coercive authority to ensure local governance and they applied this with a large degree of independence and discretion. By the mid-point of the century, however, a steady process of centralisation had resulted in a shift in the balance of power between the two with '"general rules and directives" increasingly becoming the prerogative of the centre and "details" the substance and limit of local discretion'. 3 Prior to the 1820s most social reform took place at a local level but over the next four decades the government began to take a more forceful role, first through the introduction of model clauses acts and later by establishing rules and regulations, mechanisms for inspection and grants in aid. 4 Early legislation was often permissive or applicable only in limited circumstances but over the course of the century the discretion of local government was reduced and the administration of social policy was increasingly conducted by professional or elected bodies implementing national legislation. The reform of both prisons and the police roughly followed this general trend, although policing was traditionally more 
Theorising Central-Local Relations
Centralisation did not merely entail modifications of the superstructure of the State but also represented a shift in the social distribution of power and this makes it vital that historians trying to understand the effects of such changes have some way of theorising power relations. The changing relationship between central and local government in the nineteenth century has generated both Whig and revisionist interpretations with the former focusing on bureaucratic changes and seeing centralisation as an inevitable and beneficial process while the latter present accounts centred on the displacement of one economic élite by another. Revisionist discussions are more finely attuned to the significance of the shifting distribution of power, therefore, but often struggle to provide a convincing depiction of the local arm of the State. The power or resources which agents bring to these competitions, and which determine both their position and their strategic orientation within the field, are referred to as 'capital'. 9 Capital is a resource which yields power within a particular field and it operates both as a weapon and a stake of struggle. 10 However, Bourdieu does not conceive of agents simply as '"particles" that are mechanically pushed and pulled about by external forces'. Agents' actions or practices are the result of both their position and 'an obscure and double relation' between a habitus and a field. 11 Habitus has similarities to the notion of habit and refers to 'something which one has acquired, but which has become durably incorporated in the body in the form of permanent dispositions' but which is not the result of fully conscious calculation. It is 'acquired through the lasting experience of social position' and is both durable and transposable. 12 Habitus has a circular relationship with the objective structures of society since it is a product of one's position within the game but also has an efficacy which shapes the future position and practice of a player. 13 The interplay of field, capital and habitus is best described through 20 Bourdieu distinguishes four fundamental types of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) but recognises that other forms are relevant in specific fields. 21 Symbolic capital is the most elastic of these, referring to any type of capital which is legitimately recognised as having value within a given field and so encompassing a wide range of resources. 22 In a Bourdieusian analysis of the penal and policing fields during the nineteenth century, several types of capital can be identified as having value but the most prominent form was symbolic capital -the authority to make 8 decisions concerning the operation and administration of the various agents and agencies within the fields. Symbolic capital is 'the basis of the specific authority of the holder of state power' and a crucial component of this is the power of nomination, or the authorization to appoint and dismiss officers of State. 23 The central struggle within the policing and penal fields in the nineteenth century concerned the relative levels of symbolic capital of various groups and agents, especially over this power of nomination.
The analysis which follows draws upon these concepts to explore the centralisation process in relation to prisons and policing between about 1820 and 1850 and the conflicts which accompanied this. It is important to recognise, however, that the current discussion adopts a somewhat restricted notion of the two fields. Punishment clearly involved more than just imprisonment and there were prisons run directly by central government in this period but this article concerns itself only with struggles relating to the management of county gaols and houses of correction.
Similarly, the policing field did not merely include the public police but they form the focus of the current analysis. Before going on to consider the specific course of struggles over these two areas in the county of Cheshire it is first necessary to give a brief account of the reform of prisons and policing in Bourdieusian terms.
The Reform Process
Centralisation within the penal and policing fields between 1820 and 1850 mainly involved a shift in the balance of power between central and local government. In essence, the symbolic capital of local government was 9 reduced and that of central government expanded. Prior to this, however, symbolic capital was more widely dispersed and there had been a preceding process of centralisation in which justices of the peace, the primary agents of local government for most of the nineteenth century, increased their levels of symbolic capital within the policing and penal fields.
Authority over county gaols was split between justices of the peace and the Sheriff whereas Houses of Correction were 'professedly under the direct administration of the justices of the peace.' 24 Magistrates were responsible for the conveyance and detention of offenders and were empowered to gather economic capital from the county rate to do so, although provision was minimal and gaols 'were carried on as the profitmaking concerns of the gaolers' with fees charged for almost all services, including release. 25 The job of inspection traditionally lay with the Sheriff and the Grand Jury, providing a small role for wealthy local inhabitants in the penal field. However, in 1791 this power of oversight was transferred to the magistrates who were compelled to regularly 'visit and inspect'
prisons. 26 The most significant actor within the gaol was the governor who, in the eighteenth century, was relatively free to impose regulations of his choosing. 27 The power of nomination over this crucial office was vested in the magistrates and this formed a fundamental aspect of their symbolic capital.
Within the policing field, the dispersal of symbolic capital was wider and practices varied. The inseparable relationship between the work of parochial constables and the law meant that magistrates inevitably had authority over them and eighteenth century pamphlets describe constables as the subordinate officers of the justices who were bound by law to execute their warrants. 28 Magistrates were also responsible for applying penalties in cases of misconduct as well as swearing constables in, thus vesting them with their legal authority. However, the power of nomination was not definitively that of the justices and various practices existed for appointing constables. 29 High constables and special constables were selected by magistrates but parish constables were chosen by either the parish vestry or, as was most common in Cheshire, the Court Leet.
However, there had been a long process of drawing constables more firmly under the control of justices of the peace from the sixteenth century and this continued into the nineteenth. 30 In the 1820s, therefore, magistrates had significant levels of symbolic capital within both the policing and penal fields. Central government played a minimalist role and reform was largely a local affair.
Prior to the 1820s, legislative enactments relating to prisons chiefly 36 In 1865, the government increased its ability to utilise this symbolic capital by employing economic capital as a tool of coercion through the mechanism of government grants which could be withheld for non-compliance with rules and regulations.
Finally, in 1877 the process of centralisation was completed when the control and ownership of county gaols was transferred to the Prison Commission, thus ending the role of local government in the penal field.
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Reform in the policing field followed a similar pattern but varied in outcome, falling short of full central control. Legislation prior to the 1830s focused on altering the role and value of economic capital within the field by permitting official payments for police work in an attempt to use 'avarice to overcome inertia', thus increasing prosecutions. 38 Other aspects of reform at this time were reliant on private legislation, usually through the mechanism of Improvement Acts, a model which many towns adopted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Sessions, the idea of a mixed system of control combining elements of local and central authority over policing persists to this day.
Conflicts over Prisons
Prior to the Gaol Act of 1823, Cheshire had shown a commitment to prison improvement. In 1783 it passed a local Act to improve standards of decency and discipline in gaols and houses of correction and this was one of the initiatives which influenced the national legislation of 1791, an indication of the degree to which central government was guided by its local partners in the early stages of reform. 45 The magistrates also substantially re-built Chester Gaol and constructed a new house of correction at Knutsford. Improvements continued to be made at both sites after 1823, some of which were necessitated by specifications within the Gaol Act. 46 In the early nineteenth century, the Quarter Sessions appointed
Committees to inquire into such things as prisoners' diet, the construction of solitary cells, and the introduction of crank mills and a stepping wheel. 47 Direct communication between the magistrates and the Home Office in the 1820s, however, was limited and evinces little signs of tension. There were requests for clarification or advice on the part of the magistrates and appeals for information from the Home Secretary but central government's prime concern related to its ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of internal order. 48 The magistrates had some concerns about problems emanating from section 24 of the 1823 Gaol Act which prevented those convicted of any offence more serious than petty larceny from giving evidence in court, feeling that this made it difficult to prosecute robberies committed in prison. 49 Overall, however, the initial increase of central government's symbolic capital generated little tension.
There was an increase in correspondence following the Prisons Act of 1835, often relating to aspects of the Inspector's reports. These were detailed and included recommendations as to best practice as well as cataloguing infringements of government regulations. The Inspectors' lacked any direct symbolic capital, however; their role 'was to inquire and report as to the state of the several gaols' but they could not make or alter any regulations already in place. 50 Occasionally the Home Department The magistrates' response to the inquiry was unexpected: they dismissed the prison chaplain, who had been charged with no offences by the inspector but had revealed things to Williams not previously disclosed to them. However, they took no action against the governor or the surgeon, both of whom had been criticised. The magistrates submitted a report to
Graham justifying their actions which reads as a litany of excuses for the governor. In some cases others were blamed, including the magistrates themselves, in others it was argued that such practices were longstanding or that Burgess had acted in good faith: property stolen was of 'inconsiderable value'; irregularities in recording punishments were a 'clerical error'. All charges but one were considered to be 'not of much importance'. The prolonged whipping of the young boy was recognised as 'serious' but the magistrates contended that, since Burgess had already been 'severely reprimanded', no further action was necessary. 62 It is true 20 that many of the offences were minor infringements of governmentimposed regulations which had been taking place for some time, often with the cognisance of the magistrates. In many ways, then, the Report was not so much a vindication of Burgess (to whom, as we will see, the magistrates later showed little loyalty) as a defence of local government's autonomy to manage the prison without interference from the centre.
The magistrates' defiance prompted a second, more forceful, letter from Graham which threatened the independence they sought to preserve.
He reiterated his concern at their decision, adding the ominous warning that this may 'lead to evil consequences' by 'reducing the confidence Parliament has been disposed to impart to magistrates in the superintendence and regulation of gaols'. 63 The magistrates … were highly indignant that such a functionary What united them is that they had all sat, were sitting or would in the future sit as MPs. This protracted and public dispute demonstrates the desire of the majority of the magistracy to retain their independence within the penal field: as one justice stated, 'it is our affair and we will act in this matter as we think proper'. 73 Their resistance to the Home Secretary's requests was a demonstration that, as things stood, they retained that crucial aspect of their symbolic capital -the power of nomination -and Burgess's continuation as governor for almost a year after the inquiry is a reflection of their autonomy. Central government, however, was becoming increasingly confident in its use of the symbolic capital it possessed and was not afraid to threaten the use of its ultimate power -statist capital -to ensure compliance with its wishes. Whether the government would have gone so far if it had not been so persistently pushed by Thomas Duncombe can only be surmised. Similarly, it is telling that the government used statist capital merely to pressure the magistrates, backing off from any attempt to actually alter the structure of the penal field, a task not undertaken for a further twenty-two years. 74 Yet the government had made its point: it expected compliance from the magistrates in the management of prisons and was keen to ensure that it had influence over the discipline of staff even if this fell outside its official remit.
Accustomed to playing a role within the penal field from the 1820s, by 1835 the government increased its involvement in the management of prisons and adopted a more direct and forceful approach. Its habitus changed slowly, however, and it was after 1839 that significant shifts in the use of symbolic capital by central government can be seen through more frequent references to legislation -demonstrating the basis of this symbolic capital -and a greater keenness to carry its point over key issues. By the 1840s, therefore, central government had begun to use its symbolic capital more flamboyantly and it was this which helped to generate the magistrates' entrenched response to the disagreement over Burgess.
Conflicts over Policing
There The two national models for police reform which existed after 1839 affected the symbolic capital of ratepayers differently but in Cheshire the situation was further complicated by the establishment of its own Constabulary in 1829. 76 This initiative has been described as 'the earliest police reform' in provincial England and it continued in operation until it disbandment in the wake of the County and Borough Police Act of 1856. 77 The Cheshire Constabulary was introduced by a piece of private legislation and emerged out of collaboration between central and local government.
The initial impetus for the scheme was local but the finer details were negotiated with the Home Secretary, a process which resulted in authority over the force being mainly vested in the magistrates at Quarter Session.
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Cheshire's Act empowered, but did not compel, the justices to appoint salaried Special High Constables for any hundred in the county and, on the recommendation of three justices at Petty Sessions, Assistant
Petty Constables for the townships. 78 These men were controlled by local magistrates and funded out of a two-tier system which drew from both the county and the poor rates, with the Special High Constable's salaries paid from the country rate on the Hundred but those of the Assistant Petty
Constables from the poor rates. 79 This represented an alternative form of policing to the unpaid parish constables and, since it was firmly under the authority of the justices, reduced the ability of local communities (outside boroughs) to exert control over policing. The power of nomination lay entirely with the magistrates and so ratepayers were excluded from any significant input and lacked direct authority over their local officer, their only influence being the capacity to limit any salary to £20 per annum. 80 Informal mechanisms of control within local communities were also reduced because most paid constables were responsible for groups of townships. In the early years of its operation the Constabulary encountered significant opposition which mainly resulted from this change to the structure of the field.
Bourdieu considers that agents wishing to displace dominant representations or forms primarily use strategies of succession or subversion. In this light we can see that opposition to the new constabulary relied partly on attempts to subvert the police by withholding assistance and introducing rival forms of policing. 81 The prominent form, however, 27 involved attempts to supersede the Constabulary by forcing its disbandment. The Quarter Sessions quickly began to receive petitions requesting the removal of Constabulary officers and in April 1831 the strength of opposition in one area of the county -Nantwich Hundredforced the magistrates to authorise a reduction of constables in that district. 82 There was a delay in enforcing this which amplified hostility and in the following year a county-wide meeting resolved to petition Parliament about the excessive rates imposed in Cheshire, with the Constabulary forming the chief source of complaint. 83 The petition alleged that county business had been badly managed and its first point concerned 'the arbitrary and oppressive manner in which the Cheshire Constabulary Act was carried into execution'. 84 It was argued that there had been a 'denial of justice to those ratepayers who appealed for redress' and there was resentment at 'the additional fees extracted by these extra policeofficers'. The ratepayers were disappointed in their appeal to central government as the petition received little sympathy from Parliament, but it did succeed in forcing the magistrates finally to reduce the number of constables in Nantwich.
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Petitioning was a way of using the small amounts of political capital available to the middle classes to influence local and central government.
The petitions were, among other things, an expression of the ratepayers' resentment at their loss of status within the policing field, which formed a significant threat to their local power base. Although the Constabulary continued to exist, opposition was a testament to the ability of the middle 28 classes to resist a form of policing which they perceived as acting to protect landed interests rather than their own. One of the indirect effects of this opposition was to generate a degree of ambivalence among the magistrates, particularly in areas where opposition was strong, with the result that their implementation of the Act lacked the degree of firmness necessary for the Constabulary to succeed, at least in some areas. 86 This experience of struggle with local ratepayers generated dissatisfaction among some magistrates and so, when the prospect of central government influence was introduced in 1839, there was a little enthusiasm for the national scheme. Two justices proposed adopting the County Police Act in October 1839 but the motions were postponed for 'serious and mature consideration'. 87 The issue was reconsidered in March the following year, but, by this time, uncertainty had turned to negativity and the proposal was rejected by fourteen votes to seven. 88 Instead the magistrates chose to implement their own Constabulary more uniformly throughout the county, a measure slowly introduced over the next two years. Support for the County Police Acts did not instantly dissipate, however, and a further motion was introduced in 1841 suggesting adoption solely in the rural southern districts of the county, although this was also unsuccessful. 89 Over time, as the Cheshire force was implemented more consistently, support for the measure grew and opposition declined. By 1851, the magistrates were prepared to go to the expense of a second private Act to alter the funding arrangements for their force, moving to a single rate Philips and Storch are right, however, to suggest that the debates over the County Police Act in Cheshire should lead us to reject an uncritical reading of the 'rhetoric of police reform' as, again, a model based strictly on class divisions does not quite fit the evidence. 95 There was a clear class element to the conflict between the magistrates and the ratepayersalthough it must be remembered that there was some overlap between these groups. However, the ratepayers petitioning against the police were mainly middle class and the magistrates were predominantly landed gentry or These struggles were inherently rural (much opposition stemmed from the perception that the magistrates were using the police to supplement their game protection) and belonged to a wider class struggle -that 'long affray' between the middle classes and the landed gentry over poaching which reminds us that 'the most relentless, the most persistently brutal and embittered -and the most continuous -current of violence running through the nineteenth century was not urban, but rural'. 96 The habitus of magistrates in these areas was influenced by their local circumstances and prior experience of reform.
The impact of prior experience is also evident in the overall decision of the magistrates to reject the County Police Acts which was influenced by the existence of their own constabulary. The existence of the Cheshire Constabulary enabled the magistrates to resist the encroachment of central government whilst also ensuring there were sufficient mechanisms for 33 maintaining order; a choice not available to other counties until the Parish Constables legislation was introduced and, even then, this did not offer the ability to dislodge ratepayers from their traditional position within the policing field. The structure of the policing field presented a dual threat against which the magistrates needed to defend themselves. What they negotiated, and eventually fairly comprehensively agreed upon, was a way of securing their dominance in the field against the ratepayers without ceding symbolic capital to central government.
Conclusion
Central government made moves to increase their levels of symbolic capital within both the policing and the penal fields across the first half of the nineteenth century. The most significant legislative movements towards this occurred in the 1830s and this generated significant moments of conflict between central and local government in the following decade.
However, the course and chronology of change differed between the two fields and this produced direct conflict only within the penal field. The government was prepared to use its symbolic capital with confidence and firmness in relation to struggles over prisons; they expected compliance from the localities and were prepared to legislate in order to ensure this. In 
